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Introduction
This policy brief argues that introducing demo-
cratic decentralization of forest governance in 
weak states entails a dilemma. The dilemma is 
that the governance conditions associated with 
weak states constitute both an argument for 
and an obstacle to locally-driven forest govern-
ance. This is exemplified by the case of decen-
tralized forest governance in Cambodia.
Democratic decentralization in theory 
Decentralized natural resource management has 
been high on the international development 
agenda since the passing of the RIO Declara-
tion, Agenda 21, and the Millennium Goal Dec-
laration. These declarations call for increased 
involvement of local people in natural resource 
management as an end in and of itself, but also 
as a means for reaching the combined objective 
of poverty reduction and sustainable natural 
resource management.
Decentralization is believed to further these 
objectives by vesting decision-making authority 
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Substantial incentives and discretionary power to the local communities and their insti­
tutions
A strategy for how state agencies can be brought to support and protect the local insti­
tutions, and thereby enabling them to exercise discretionary powers
Means to counterbalance top­down relationships between national and local institutions 
such as linking local institutions to NGOs with good track records, or supporting them to 
form regional and national level interest organisations
Policy Conclusions
over natural resources with the people who bear the direct 
costs of their decline and degradation, and through invok-
ing feelings of ownership and responsibility toward natural 
resources by providing people with incentives in the form of 
substantial tenure rights. Finally, it is believed that local people 
will be in a better position to manage natural resources eq-
uitably and efficiently as they, due to their physical presence, 
have better information about the resources and local needs. 
Proponents of democratic decentralization (devolution) 
maintain that if decentralization is to result in efficient and 
equitable management of natural resources, then significant 
domains of power must be entrusted to downward account-
able local institutions. The expected benefits derive from 
the democratic processes that encourage representative and 
accountable local authorities to serve the needs of their con-
stituents. This is contrary to de-concentration, which implies 
a transfer of power to central governments’ local antennas. 
Some scholars recommend that the local institutions in natural 
resource management become as independent of the state as 
possible. To them, the expected benefits derive from linking 
rights and responsibilities. 
Other scholars question these assumptions, and point to the 
potential risks, e.g., that local communities are ridden with 
conflicting interests and prone to capture by local elites; that 
even perfectly representative downward accountable local 
authorities may ignore minority interests; and that, when prof-
itable, collective decision makers are likely to exploit natural 
resources rather than conserve them, especially if they do not 
bear the indirect costs or costs that accrue later. The propo-
nents maintain that these risks arise mainly because demo-
cratic decentralization in reality rarely meets the theoretical 
prescriptions. This also makes it difficult to test the theory in 
practice, including in Cambodia.
Democratic decentralization in the Cambodian  
forest sector
Cambodia’s forest area constitutes approximately 60% of the 
total land area or 10 million ha (official numbers), but is dimin-
ishing and degrading at a high rate. This development imperils 
access to forest products and services for the large rural popu-
lation of Cambodia. Many donor agencies and NGOs recom-
mend democratic decentralization in the forest sector. 
Currently, community forestry constitutes the only form of de-
centralized forest governance in Cambodia. The Royal Govern-
ment of Cambodia (RGC) has recognized community forestry 
with the passing of the Forest Law (2002) and the Community 
Forestry sub-decree (2003).  According to this legislation, the 
first task of community forestry groups is to comply with the 
Forest Administration’s orders; and their discretionary powers 
are very limited. They have therefore been criticized for linking 
up too closely with the Forest Administration, and for not be-
ing genuine downward accountable local institutions. 
An alternative model, partnership forestry, has been proposed 
by donors. According to this model, commune councils elabo-
rate a forest plan to be approved by the Forest Administration, 
implement the approved plan, and become entitled to retain 
all royalties and fees from the natural resource. This model is 
also part of Cambodia’s not yet implemented National Forest 
Programme 2010. 
Since 2008, the commune councils have been elected by gen-
eral franchise, and should therefore presumably provide for 
more downward accountability than the community forestry 
groups. However, in reality, the councils have had no inde-
pendent authority over forests as yet, and their actual capacity 
is low. Furthermore, reforms in 2008 increased the power of 
the ruling party over the commune councils. Hence, both in 
terms of discretionary powers and downward accountability, 
the reality of the commune councils falls short of the theoreti-
cal prescriptions for democratic decentralization. 
In conclusion, there is little democratic decentralization in the 
forest sector in Cambodia, and its theoretical promises can 
therefore only be investigated indirectly. We have done this by 
identifying some of the main constraints for forest governance 
in Cambodia to contribute towards poverty reduction and 
sustainable forest management, and then discussing whether 
democratic decentralization may contribute to overcoming 
In weak states, democratic decentralization in natural resource management must, as a mini­
mum, come together with:
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them. In doing so, we refer to primary as well as secondary 
data.
Will democratic decentralization contribute to over-
coming the constraints in local forest governance?
There are currently two main types of constraint to local forest 
governance in Cambodia: an increasing number of conflicts 
and a lack of incentives for communities to manage forests 
sustainably. The question is whether democratic decentraliza-
tion may contribute to overcoming these constraints?  
Will democratic decentralization contribute to solving the 
conflicts in the forest sector?
Local communities in Cambodia experience an increasing 
number of conflicts with powerful external actors. These in-
clude the military who often, more or less independently of 
other state agencies, supplement a low budget by logging, 
including in community forests. Another increasing problem is 
economic land concessions converting forest into plantations. 
The concessions often belong to private government officials 
or are sanctioned by state agencies through procedures which 
are not always transparent. The government has also been 
criticized for its direct involvement in logging and land specu-
lation, for rent seeking behaviour in land and forestry issues, 
and for low governance capacity. 
There are also forest related conflicts within and between 
local communities. Many of these conflicts are caused by am-
biguous national legal frameworks resulting in, e.g., unclear 
borders between communes and unclear tenure rules; and a 
lack of communication and enforcement of laws. Some villag-
ers encroach on forest land because they perceive agricultural 
land as more secure than forest land. Encroachment also fol-
lows from social dynamics such as population increase and 
migration, contributing to the dilemma between the need for 
cultivation and the need for forest products. 
There is, in other words, a pressing need to strike hard on il-
legal and rent-seeking activities in order to ensure basic rights 
for the rural population in relation to forest. Furthermore, 
there is a need for better coordination of laws and govern-
ment agencies within and across Ministries, to deal with gaps 
in national legal frameworks, and to control the military. Com-
munity forestry groups cannot deal with such problems that 
belong to the national level. The conflicts internal to the com-
munities caused by ambiguous national legal frameworks may 
find short-term local solutions. But they too cannot be per-
manently solved at the local level. A transfer of discretionary 
powers to commune councils will hardly do the trick either, 
not even if commune councils become perfectly downward 
accountable. Left unsolved, however, these problems will, 
most likely, severely impede the fulfilment of the promises of 
democratic decentralization, as communities will be unable to 
exercise their discretionary powers. 
Will democratic decentralization come with substantial incen-
tives?
Currently, community forestry groups suffer from a lack of 
substantial incentives. They are given rights over mainly low-
value forests, according to the law they have to wait for 5 
years before they can harvest other than non timber forest 
products (NTFP), and tenure is limited to periods of 15 years. 
Even within these periods the state can claim back the forest 
at any time. According to some community forestry groups, 
community forestry makes no substantial positive difference 
to their livelihoods, and sometimes even constitutes a burden. 
They consider patrolling the forest as their main responsibility, 
but they “have little time, and get no salary for patrolling the 
forests”. Sometimes “people do not take their turn because 
they have to take care of their own things”. 
Other communities do value their community forests. They 
gain limited benefits from collecting NTFPs and expect to gain 
more in the future from timber and poles. However, many 
emphasize support and protection by an NGO and/or the For-
est Administration as one of the main benefits. As an example 
of protection, one of the community forestry groups reported 
that an NGO recently averted an attempt by the military to 
take over their forest by mobilizing the Forest Administration 
and successfully file a court case. Another benefit mentioned 
from links with NGOs is income generating activities not nec-
essarily related to forestry. 
In order to work, democratic decentralization must come with 
substantial incentives preferably related to the natural resource 
in question. In Cambodia, this could happen in principle, if 
downward accountable commune councils were given dis-
cretionary powers, including rights to high-value forest areas, 
and rights to harvest and market valuable forest products 
within ecologically sustainable limits. The likelihood of such 
transfer is, however, low given the vested interests of power-
ful state agents in forestry. Furthermore, it would imply a risk 
of aggravating conflicts with powerful external actors such as 
the military and speculators. This would create an even greater 
need for support and protection of commune councils to en-
sure their ability to exercise these discretionary powers.  
Ideally, the state could manage forests ensuring that the in-
terests of communities were catered for. Presently, however, 
the Cambodian state is not capable and/or willing to do so, 
which is the argument for transferring powers to local institu-
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tions. However, given the powerful external interests within 
and external to the state, local institutions need credible and 
long-term support and protection to be able to exercise their 
powers – but risk being left alone exactly due to the weak-
nesses of and contradictions within the state. This constitutes 
a dilemma and needs to be addressed in theory as well as in 
practice.  
Conclusion
The problems experienced in local forestry in Cambodia cor-
respond to the type of problems that characterize weak states 
in general, such as the lack of the essential capacity and/or 
will to establish and maintain legitimate, transparent and ac-
countable political institutions; securing their populations from 
violent conflicts; meeting their basic human needs; and differ-
ent government institutions operating independently of each 
other. This shows that there is an inherent dilemma in intro-
ducing democratic decentralization of forest governance in 
weak states. The main dilemma is that, in order to work, local 
institutions basically need the state’s support and protection in 
terms of ensuring basic tenure rights etc., but being weak, the 
state is not likely to provide this support, and even constitutes 
the main cause of the problems. 
Nevertheless, there are many good reasons to promote 
democratic decentralization even in a weak-state setting like 
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Cambodia. First, there is hardly any attractive alternative. 
Second, democratic decentralization is worthwhile if it comes 
with substantial incentives, together with the support and 
protection necessary for local institutions to actually exercise 
discretionary powers. Third, democratic decentralization can 
build democratic capacity in that it creates an opportunity 
for people to participate in decisions important to their own 
situation, an opportunity they did not have before. Only: in 
a weak-state setting like Cambodia, strong links with state 
institutions should sometimes be seen as an advantage rather 
than as a disadvantage, and support from NGOs or even bet-
ter, national organisation of communities, should be seen as a 
necessary element to counterbalance the top-down relation-
ship between state authorities and communities. 
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